anthrax contamination are recorded during both World War I and World War II.
Anthrax has three clinical forms: inhalational (the most deadly form ), cutaneous, and gastrointestinal. Research on anthra x as a biological weapon began more than 80 years ago (Christopher, 1997 ) . It is believed at least 17 nations have offensive biological weapons programs and it is uncertain how many of these are anthra x. However, Iraq has acknowledged producing and weaponizing anthrax (Zilinskas, 1997) .
The largest accidental aerosolized release of anthrax spores was from a military microbiology facility in Serdlovsk in the Soviet Union in 1979. This incident resulted in 79 cases of anthrax infection and 68 deaths, and dem onstrated the lethality of anthrax when aerosolized in optimal weather conditions (Meselson, 1994) . Only 18 cases of inhalational anthrax occurred in the United States from 1900 to 1978. Two of these cases were seen in laborato ry workers (Inglesby, 1980) .
THE FRONT LINE
Congressional staff members and others who work on Capitol Hill have the potential to be on the front lines of a bioterrorist attack. Because of the possibility of terrorist activity, Congressional staff members are regularly provided with briefings about the potential for mail and letter bombs. Following the September II th attack, there was special cause for concern and, subsequently, a higher than usual state of vigilance among staff who opened the mail and who may have been exposed to contaminated mailings. This was bolstered by a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) report (200 1) describing two cases of anthrax in Florida determined to be intentional acts.
On October 15, 2001 at approximately 10 a.m., a staff member opened a letter sent to Senator Daschle in the Hart Senate Office Building. A white powder inside that envelope was aerosolized upon opening. The staff member immediately reported this incident. Within minutes, law enforcement officials, the emergency medical response team from the Office of the Attending Physician, and other officials were on the scene. The police evacuated staff members from the affected offices to another area and cordoned off the crime scene. The Chem-Bio Unit of the U.S. Capitol Police performed field tests. The results were positive for the presence of anthrax.
The staff members in the affected offices were immediately treated on scene with antibiotics (ciprofloxacin), and nasal swabs were performed to assess exposure to anthrax. Through modeling analysis, U.S. Army scientists have determined there is usually no significant risk to personnel responding to contaminated areas (Chinn, 1996) . Because there are no clinical studies on the treatment of inhalation anthrax in humans, early treatment with antibiotics is based on the results of empirical studies. Studies performed on monkeys infected with anthrax showed that the antibiotic doxycycline was efficacious (Ivins, 1996) . However, fears that Russian scientists had engineered a strain of anthrax resistant to ciprofloxacin, penicillin, and doxycycline were envisioned (Friedlander, 1996) .
Ciprofloxacin, proven effective against other bacteria and tested in an animal study in 1993, was recommended as the drug of choice for this exposure. Fluoroquinolones, like ciprofloxacin, are not generally recommended for adolescents and small children because of their known association with arthropathy. Animal studies have shown that no evidence of teratogenicity related to ciprofloxacin exists (Kahn, 200 I) . Although there are no controlled studies of ciprofloxacin in pregnant women, amoxicillin was recommended for prophylaxis by the Attending Physician of our office, and the consulting physicians from the CDC, and the chief of Infectious Diseases of National Naval Hospital at Bethesda, Maryland.
NASAL SWABBING
Nasal swabbing (with a synthetic tipped swab) is used to test for exposure to anthrax spores. Although swabbing itself is of no real value in making client care decisions, its use lies in helping determine the exposure perimeter. Nasal swabbing needs to be carefully explained to clients. It helps determine exposure but does not predict development of the anthrax disease. A client exposed to anthrax may not necessarily develop subsequent illness, defined as anthrax disease.
A common question related to why clients who tested negative (no exposure) on the nasal swab needed to take 60 days of antibiotics. The 60 day course had been recommended for those clients in the "hot zones," the areas immediately surrounding the area where the anthrax had been aerosolized. Clients were reassured because out of the several thousands of clients tested, only 28 positive tests were found and those were from APRIL 2002, VOL. 50, NO.4 individuals in the direct exposure area. The CDC, the Department of Federal Environmental and Occupational Health (DFEOH), the U.S. Public Health Service, and the Attending Physician to Congress decided to begin testing staff members (by nasal swab) who were potentially exposed in other areas where mail is sorted (e.g., loading docks, freight elevators). Other staff and personnel who directly handle mail before delivery to their destination were also tested.
With the assistance of the U.S. Capitol Police, officials of the CDC, DFEOH, U.S. Public Health Service, and the Office of the Attending Physician, areas defined as hot zones were identified and maps with floor plans, office numbers, stairwells, and elevators were outlined. Individuals in the hot zones were identified, called, and treated.
Testing of potentially exposed individuals continued the following day. Personnel from the Office of the Attending Physician, DFEOH, and military hospitals formed "swab teams," consisting of nurses, technicians, and physicians. Each team consisted of two people-one recorded client information and the other performed nasal swab testing, if indicated. Those tested were individuals who had been in the defined hot zones (e.g., newspaper reporters, TV camera crews, contractors from phone companies, information technology personnel, maintenance workers, cleaning personnel, lobbyists, constituents of Members of Congress, tour guides, group leaders visiting Capitol Hill, Senate pages).
The swabbing began in the clinic offices and soon spilled into the hallways. People were asked to fill out forms containing name, address, social security numbers, date of birth, work and home phone numbers, and their employer's name. After they had filled out the label on the culturette container, their nasal passages were swabbed. If they were in the hot zone, the team recommended and dispensed a 60 day course of antibiotic treatment. In addition to the testing, the Office of the Attending Physician recommended Capitol employees obtain the influenza vaccine to help minimize flu like symptoms, which might be mistaken for anthrax symptoms.
Additional supplies for testing and plating were ordered to accommodate the large volume of clients during the initial days following the event. Nasal swabbing was conducted on such a large scale that disseminating nasal swab test results to clients proved quite challenging. Real time data entry was implemented at the test sites to avoid transcription delays. A phone bank was set up off site and manned by health care professionals. A professional counselor was also available at this site for individuals having difficulty coping with this event. Personnel from the U.S. Public Health Service and DFEOH were asked to assist with the data input process. An important lesson learned from this was that a networking database should be set up in advance to allow easier retrieval and updating of information.
COMMUNICATION
Effective communication was a very important part of coordinating this event. Briefings for staff were 4 Outcomes from this experience are helpful to other occupational health nurses for improving their emergency preparedness bioterrorism plan.
2 Many of the strategies used for care , testing, and communication immediately after the anthrax attack were based on learning from and responding to the uniqueness of the situation.
3 Continuing physical and emotional care of victims postevent was crucial. The effects of this anthrax attack exacted a physical and emotional toll for weeks after the event. Effective communication prevented confusion, unified the team , and reassured clients.
CONTINUING CARE
The effects of this anthrax attac k exa cted a physical and emotional toll on health ca re workers for weeks after the event. Extra ordinary efforts wer e made to rem ain available to cli ent s throughout the wee ks for questions and coun sel ing. Open discussion s about the event and periodic briefings for those who were in the hot zones were particularly help ful. Employee co unseling programs already in place were used. Abo ve all, having the office of the Attending Physician to Congre ss open during tho se initial weekends for que stion s was co mforting.
Logistical probl em s were ant icipated for c lients who left town foll owing the event and missed receivin g antibiotics . Tempora ry clinical statio ns were set up in the hall way outside the Ca pitol clini c. Staffed by nurses, the se areas facilitated med ication distribution and assessment of problems for physician consultation, counseling, and edu cation.
SUMMARY
One great fear was real ized on October 15, 200 I when United Stat es citizens witnesse d firsthand the unprecedented rele ase of anthrax into a community. Although the office of the Attending Physic ian to Congress had been preparing for such an unthinkable act, lessons were learned as the event s unfolded. The following is a summary of the finding s: • Preparation, planning, and frequent review of bioterrorism response procedures are essential. • Effective communication remains the key to successful team performance. Briefin gs conducted daily and on an as needed basis shape the progress and perform ance of the team memb ers. Electroni c mail may not nece ssarily be the most effective way to disseminate critical information because not everyo ne can access the Intern et outside of the work environment. Settin g up a call center for answering client's questions is crucial. • Clients potentially exposed to anthrax should be evacuated from the immediate area. Testing is not indicated for everyone, only those in the immediate areas . Allow health care personnel to decide whom should be tested . Such health care decision s must not be made based on anxiety or expediency.
• A data collection template should be set up in advance. This template should include, at least, the following : name, date of birth, social security number, the physical location of where the client might have been exposed, antibiotics administered and dosage, test results, and home and work phone number. This should be networked so a group can access and update data in real time.
• If the occupational health clinic ha s its own pharmac y, have a pill counter available to help with antibiotic di stribution : • The team should meet several times daily to ensure di ssemin ation of a reli able and consistent message to the client s. • Team members sho uld be prep ared to review the medi cal as pec ts of anthrax with clients on a frequ ent
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The roles and responsibilities of the occupational health team after a terrorist attack atthe United States Capitol proved to be the most challenging to date. 1 conducted frequentl y for the purpose of disseminating information to the staff, so all que stion s co uld be answered in a con sistent fashion . Proto col s were subject to change as new hot zon e areas were discovered. Effect ive communic ation prevent s con fusion , uni fies a team, and reassures clients. It is imp ort ant to consider devel op ing a web site to provide up to date information to clients. Phone call s were diverted fro m the Att ending Phy sician 's Offic e to a call center set up to handle cli ent que stion s and to distribute test result s. Elect ronic mail was not as helpful because not everyon e had Intern et access outside of their workspace s, which had been closed off as a crime scene.
POST EVENT CARE
The testing continued for 2 days after the event. People lined up in the hallways outside the clinics and testing sites. Anxiety and frustration were clearly evident on the faces of those waiting. Many questions were fielded related to the indication s for testing and how anthrax was transmitted. Briefings continued as clients stood in line. The determ ination of whether or not to treat with antibiotics was made based on careful consideration of whether or not an individual' s exposure risk was high. Off site phone banks remained opened for several weeks to accomm odate concerned clients and individuals who might not have received timely information about the incident. This experience p.-~'.' ided a unique opportunity for the Office of the Attending Physician to Congress to put its bioterrorism plan into action. Nothing substitutes for preparedness. Communication was the most important tool because it kept the team informed and focused on the mission at hand. It behooves all occupational health nurses to begin preparing for future acts as extraordinary as the anthrax attack that occurred on October 15,2001.
